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Complexity of Electricity Markets and The Future of Regulation: Insights from the Turkish 
Experience  
 
Abstract 
Electricity pricing models were designed at a time when technology was relatively stable. The 
natural monopoly model was based on a uni-directional pricing mechanism. Electricity was 
generated at one end and transferred to the other end. Pollution was not a big issue. There 
were no solar panels over the houses of consumers. Many contemporary issues of the 
ecosystem of electricity were not relevant. The tariff model was meant to be a simple one, even 
though it included many variables. It was not  a complex system. This paper argues that a 
model that was designed within a simple system cannot efficiently adapt to a multidimensional 
and interdependent system. The use of the old regulatory model within a complex system 
creates rents and inefficiencies.  
 
This paper evaluates the electricity tariff model in Turkey under the light of recent technological 
advances and changes in the structure of electricity markets. The changes in the institutional 
environment of the market bring electricity markets closer to a complex system. We argue that 
the tariff mechanism should also be revised accordingly. We use the Turkish electricity industry 
as an example, as it reflects the issues in a developing country.  
 
Keywords: ​Complexity;  electricity distribution; electricity tariffs; regulation; renewables; 
Turkish electricity industry 
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1. Introduction 
 
Electricity pricing models were designed at a time when technology was relatively stable. It had 
the characteristics of the natural monopoly model. The natural monopoly model was based on a 
uni-directional pricing mechanism. Electricity was generated at one end and transferred to the 
other end. Pollution was not a big issue. There were no solar panels over the houses of 
consumers. Many contemporary issues of the ecosystem of electricity were not relevant. The 
tariff model was meant to be a simple one, even though it included many variables. It was not a 
complex system.  This paper argues that a model that was designed within a simple system 1
cannot efficiently adapt to a multidimensional and interdependent system. Any attempt to use 
the old tariff model within the new system opens doors to rents and inefficiencies.  
 
This paper looks at the current regulatory model in Turkey from a complexity theory perspective. 
The regulatory tariff models are based on the assumption of an electricity system with 
well-designed and stable agents and technologies. Increasing complexity of the electricity 
system started to change this presumption. More importantly, the changes in the institutional 
environment of energy markets brings electricity distribution closer to a complex system. 
However, both the theory and practice of regulation remains stuck in the natural monopoly 
thinking..We argue that tariff mechanisms should also be revised accordingly. We use the 
Turkish electricity industry as an example. Turkey is relatively behind in terms of complexity of 
the electricity systems. Existing problems of implementations and imperfections of the tariff 
model increases the costs of not adapting to a complex market order. Obviously, the issue is 
relevant for many countries that use some kind of tariff model.  2
 
Electricity tariffs are based on the strict separation of supply and demand. Regulatory policy 
controls the supply with a given demand structure. It assumes that the boundaries of supply and 
demand are well defined. When the boundaries become blurry, the regulatory tariff model 
becomes unsustainable, as the ‘Sun Tax’ experience in Spain shows. When consumers began 
to be  producers and reduced their demand for grid-supplied electricity, the costs for existing 
customers increased, creating a vicious circle for the grid. The ensuing implementation of 
grid-tax on solar power made things worse leading to the elimination of the ‘sun tax’. The 
increasing complexity of the system could not be controlled with a centralized Pigovian tax. 
 
Recent advances in technology are not limited to new methods of generating electricity. 
Consumers control their consumption with different devices such as storage beyond the meter 
and intelligent appliances. Devices such as smart thermometers and advanced appliances 
influence patterns of consumption and weaken the century-old assumptions of the electricity 
1 The distinction between simple and complex systems is based on the complexity literature. See Page 
(2011) for a general discussion.  
2 Rate of return or price/revenue cap models are widely used in tariff mechanisms around the world 
(Joskow, 2008; Viscusi et al., 2005).  
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industry. Electricity infrastructure moves toward being a platform that brings together different 
parties rather than being a one-way production system from generation to consumption.   3
 
Technological advances, even if they are widely observed and studied, have not triggered a 
need for change in regulatory models around the world. Even in the advanced economies such 
as the United States and EU countries, the dominant policy is to wait and see how the change in 
technology will play out in terms of regulatory consequences (Revezs and Unel, 2020).  
 
The large scale utilities will continue to dominate the energy markets for the foreseeable future. 
However, the fall in costs of individual generation and storage facilities increase decentralization 
in terms of pricing-decisions. The existence of arbitrage opportunities for consumers make 
utilities more vulnerable to non-regulated aspects of electricity markets. 
 
Technological advances move very quickly to developing countries. For example, Turkey’s 
renewable market has grown substantially over the last decade. The regulatory model in Turkey 
has its own imperfections. The inefficiencies of the system is widely discussed in the literature 
(Cetin and Oğuz, 2007). In general, design problems, the openness to political interference and 
institutional shortcomings can be traced back to deficiencies in pricing mechanisms. The 
privatization model in Turkey was intended to bring more competition to the industry. Yet, the 
policy-makers could not pursue competition-based policies forcefully (Ulusoy and Oğuz, 2007). 
Legal setbacks and economic constraints limited the process. The model assumed a smooth 
process of transition based on the theoretical model of privatization process (e.g., Megginson 
and Netter, 2001). However, strong interdependencies among stakeholders made the outcome 
uncertain and indeterminate. 
 
While there is a growing literature on different aspects of the Turkish electricity markets, the 
challenges for the regulatory model that originate from increasing complexity of the electricity 
system has not taken much attention. The dearth of studies that focus on the economic 
consequences of the tariff model provided the motivation for this paper. We aim to contribute to 
the literature by discussing the potential and actual problems with the existing model and 
address policy issues surrounding it. 
 
The paper starts with a discussion of basic characteristics of complexity and its implications for 
energy markets.  In the second section, we outline major changes in energy markets that 
contribute to the complexity of interactions among market participants and regulators. The third 
section focuses on the regulatory model in the Turkish electricity markets. Our emphasis is on 
the structure of the tariff mechanism. The fourth section focuses on problems in the current 
model that originate from regulating a complex market with a model that cannot account for 
complexity. We also discuss the consequences of inability to implement the current model. We 
conclude with recommendations about the future of the tariff model in Turkey.  
3 Some recent work argues for a Uber of Airbnb type of role for electricity distribution (eg., Kiesling et al. 
2019). Even though electricity markets are still far from this point, technological advances make it more 
plausible as time passes.  
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2. On the Complexity of Modern Electricity Markets 
 
Let us start with the distinction between a simple and complex system (Mitchell, 2009; Page, 
2010).  Melaine Mitchell (2009: 13) defines a complex system as ‘a system in which large 4
networks of components with no central control and simple rules of operation give rise to 
complex collective behavior, sophisticated information processing, and adaptation via learning 
or evolution.’ What separates a complex system from a simple one is the role of adaptability and 
interdependency.  In complex systems, agents can change their behavioral patterns and adapt 5
to new situations. The second characteristic of a complex system is about existing 
interdependencies between agents. Being part of a network becomes a bigger factor than 
individual traits of agents. These characteristics are essential parts of current electricity markets 
at different levels. 
 
The modern electricity systems evolve toward complex adaptive systems. They have become 
adaptive and interrelated in many respects from generation to retail markets. Central command 
over the system becomes increasingly absent. Understanding each sub-sector or agent does 
not tell much about the whole system (Bale et al., 2015).  
 
Until recent times, electricity markets did not involve much complexity. However, economic and 
technological advances made them complex systems. In a modern energy system, there are 
many agents such as households, suppliers, regulators, governments and so on. They 
continuously adapt themselves to a changing environment. Having only limited knowledge and 
ability to interpret the environment, they cannot act as perfectly rational. Bounded rationality of 
actors in the electricity system along with interdependency and adaptive behavior turns 
electricity into a social evolutionary system, which goes beyond the engineering model 
underlying the supply of electricity.  
 
Social networks of agents are central decision-making processes along with physical 
characteristics of the energy system. Institutions start to play a major role in decisions by 
households’ electricity consumption and government policies toward the suppliers. A 
spontaneous order evolves out of these interactions. Disequilibrium dominates outcomes and 
norms and institutions evolve to reduce frictions in the system. Path dependency and adaptive 
behavior dominates the system. In the end, electricity is generated and consumed, yet the 
process and outcome take a shape different from any well-designed equilibrium model 
anticipates. It no longer fits the simple model of neoclassical economic optimization.   
4 The  complexity theory, or complex adaptive systems, has advanced substantially for the last three 
decades, particularly after the founding of the Santa Fe Institute. Since our intention is not to delve into 
this literature, we provide a very simple description. 
5 There has been some recent work that apply complex adaptive systems to electricity markets (e.g., Bale 
et al. 2015, Lukszo, 2018). The simulations developed in the literature usually assume a decentralized, 
multi-agent, multi-equilibrium processes. There are also recent concepts such as Transactive Energy that 
would potentially bring more decentralization to electricity markets. See Yin et al. (2019) for a discussion.  
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In complex electricity systems, individual participants control almost nothing, but affect 
everything. 
     
Electricity has long been described as a natural monopoly (Cornell and Kihm, 2015). Provision 
of electricity through a monopoly franchise was meant to be a practical solution rather than a 
theoretical advance. Yet, it has become the standard model of regulation in electricity markets, 
particularly in distribution. The natural monopoly model assumed that there was a one-way 
relationship between generation and retail. It required regulation by the government via price 
and quantity controls. The tariff model did not have any mechanisms for interdependencies 
within the system. For example, consumers were not allowed in the model to be producers at 
the same time and they did not change their position depending on market signals. Each 
segment of the market was modeled separately. For example, the function and cost structure of 
a distribution company was shaped by this one-directional relation from transmission to 
wholesale market.  
 
In a typical electricity tariff model, there are many variables and the model gets very complicated 
in many instances. At this point a distinction should be made between complex and being 
^complicated’, following Page’s description (Page, 2011). A complicated system can involve 
many variables and huge amounts of data. As long as it does not involve adaptability of agents 
and interdependencies between them, it is not called a complex system. For example, chess is 
a very complicated game, but it is not a complex one, as pieces in the game do not change the 
way they act during the game and actions of pieces are independent.  
 
Models developed within the complexity science provide tools to investigate the interactions 
between elements of a system.  The emergent behavior of the system and the way it responds 6
to its environment can be studied in an evolutionary way. The concept of complexity is used in 
electricity literature to refer to engineering and economic optimization problems that have to be 
solved (Crampton, 2017: 591). In the terminology of complexity theory, unless endogenous 
adaptation and interdependency play a dominant role in decision-making process, it remains as 
a complicated model, not a compex one. 
 
A complex system can be modeled based on a number of characteristics (Bale et.al., 2015): 
- Agents 
- Networks 
- Dynamics 
- Self-organization 
- Path-dependency 
6 ​Complexity theory started mostly with the work by the Santa Fe Institute in the United States. 
The pioneering work by Brian Arthur and others made it possible to analyze economic activity 
as a complex adaptive system (Arthur, 1999). Friedrich Hayek was also instrumental in 
providing the outline of complex systems (Fiori, 2009). 
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- Emergence 
- Coevolution 
- Learning and adaptation 
 
Agents, for example, refer to individuals or groups within the system. Complexity models are 
able to account for the learning and adaptation by agents with the help of advanced computing 
technologies. They respond to changing conditions and evolve in terms of their behavioral 
patterns. In an energy market, households are typical examples of agents. They can constantly 
change their electricity consumption, become producers and affected by the legislation or 
infrastructure.  
 
Agents and other components of energy systems are usually studied by equation based models 
in a partial equilibrium or general equilibrium context. More sophisticated models such as 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) can include many variables. Yet they remain in the area 
of simple models as they cannot account for adaptation and interdependence in an evolutionary 
environment. Tariff models used for regulating electricity markets are very complicated models. 
However, they are in the spirit of natural monopoly pricing. Even though their system is very 
complicated, a natural monopoly model of electricity distribution does not have the 
characteristics of a complex system. The regulation of a complex system with a simple tariff 
model opens doors to inefficiencies in many instances. 
 
Recent developments such as agent-based models were developed to address issues with 
static modeling. Yet, their complicated structure did not find many advocates among 
practitioners. Complex adaptive systems have begun to be used to provide tools to deal with 
increasing dynamic structure and complexity of the system.   7
 
The evolution of the electricity grid from a complexity perspective can be described in the 
following way (Lave, 2016):  8
1. Traditional Modeling: Based on well-established physics and mathematics. Electricity is 
thought to be an engineering subject. Right mathematical construction is sufficient to 
solve any grid problems. Calculating power flow with known loads and generation can be 
given as an example. Decisions about the necessary line rating, current amount etc. can 
be done easily within this modeling. 
2. Non-traditional Modeling: Uncertainty can be introduced into the model, as more data 
becomes available.  Complicated models such as stochastic optimization models 
7 For example, Argonne National Laboratory is in the process of developing the Electricity Market 
Complex Adaptive System Model. See ​https://ceeesa.es.anl.gov/projects/emcas.html​. Its models are 
designed for regulatory authorities interested in market structure and its effect on consumers, 
transmission and market operators. The model provides guidance to understand the electricity system, 
market performance and strategies by distribution companies. See also Sanstad (2015) and Tesfatsion 
(2018). 
8 Lave (2016) provides a detailed analysis of implementation of complexity to energy markets.  
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become possible to use. Questions such as how to account for intermittent solar power 
for supply security can be dealt with in this perspective.  
3. Complex modeling: Complex systems involve human action in a learning and evolving 
environment. Determining the probability and effects of events that happen seldomly. 
Simulations about weather changes, cascading failures, agent-based models can be 
given as examples to used models. Decisions about designing best electricity grid 
structure to optimize resilience can be made by using these models. 
 
There has been some recent work on implementing complexity theory in electricity systems 
such as smart grids (Pagani and Aiello, 2011), the behavior of agents such as prosumers’ 
activities and dynamic behavior of the grid and studying cascading failures in interdependent 
networks. Recent applications of complexity theory in electricity markets reflect the increasing 
decentralization of the electricity system. An electricity system starts to look like a 
self-organizing process, rather than a static engineering model. 
 
While electricity systems evolve into complex models, the regulation of these systems still follow 
the traditional modeling. In the rest of the paper, we look at the regulatory model and emphasize 
the necessity to create an adaptive tariff model to address the dynamic structure of a complex 
electricity system.  
 
Technological advances increase interdependency and make the agents more adaptive to 
changes. In the next section, we touch upon a few major changes in electricity systems, which 
are extensively dealt with in the relevant literature.   9
3. Reasons for Reconsidering the Regulation of DSOs 
The regulatory model of electricity distribution was designed when the technology was relatively 
stable. It started with the rate of return regulation and evolved into the incentive regulation 
models. Many countries around the world implement some kind of incentive regulation model 
such as price and revenue caps (Joskow, 2008).  When Stephen Littlechild and Michael 
Beesley (1980) first developed incentive regulation, it aimed to eliminate the problems of the 
rate of return regulation. The goal was to replicate competitive outcomes as closely as possible. 
Regulation was a transitory stage in the transition to a competitive market.  
 
During the last few decades technology has advanced substantially and the natural monopoly 
model started to create inefficiencies in the tariff model. One example may give some idea on 
the speed and size of the change. The share of solar in the new installed capacity is increasing 
around the world. It was around 50% percent in the U.S. in 2017. The same trend is observed in 
many developing countries as well. For example, there has been a substantial increase in solar 
panels beyond meters in Turkey (Bulut and Muratoglu, 2018). The fall of the cost per kw is the 
major factor in this increase in the share of solar. The cost of residential solar systems has 
9 There is now an expansive literature both academic and non-academic. See IEA (2016) for a general 
discussion. 
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dropped more than 70 percent since 2010 (Fu et al., 2018). Even though the cost of residential 
solar has not dropped to a level that encourages people in cities to install solar panels en 
masse, technology is not far from that point.   10
 
In the traditional regulatory model, DSOs had the role of being ‘transporters’ of electricity. Thus, 
they had to provide some kind of universal access to electricity. They were assumed to provide 
the service as efficiently as possible and transfer gains of efficiency to consumers. 
 
The role of DSOs changed substantially in the last decade. The following are some of the major 
changes (Perez-Arriega and Knittel, 2016): 
1. One fundamental change came from advances in distributed generation. The advances 
in wind and solar power and small scale hydro turbines changed the structure of the 
supply and demand. Advances in small scale generation such as rooftop solar also 
changed the relationship between the DSO and consumers. As a result, not all electricity 
goes through the distribution system. Bilateral contracts that bypass the distribution 
segment and generation by consumers increase the average cost of the grid-based 
consumption. The reduction in the share of electricity through the distribution system 
makes the existing tariff model unsustainable in the long-run. 
2. Advances in storage technology and electric vehicles create diversification and increase 
the share of electricity that move beyond the distribution market. The distribution tariffs 
started at a time when distribution meant using a resource that was not storable, and the 
use was not a substitute for other energy resources such as oil. 
3. Technological advances have the tendency to decrease the DSO revenues 
(Pérez-Arriaga, 2010). The integration of distributed generation, energy conservation 
measures and other factors reduce electricity demand during the implementation 
periods. The increasing flexibility of non-distribution components of electricity markets 
increases the complexity of the system. 
4. The revenue-cap model does not encourage innovation as expected. Empirical studies 
show that the ratchet effect is more prominent in the industry. The model does not have 
any variable or component to reduce the ratchet effect. In other words, it encourages 
x-inefficiency of distribution companies.  11
In this changing environment, the role of DSOs also evolves. They become more than just a 
network operator. Advances in financial and technological dimensions require changes in the 
tariff model as well. These advances in technology create the possibility of transforming 
electricity distribution into a platform market rather than being an integrated entity (Kiesling et 
10 Falling costs in commercial and utility level solar has been higher than residential solar over the last 
decade (Fu et al., 2018). The difference between change in utility and residential level solar costs create 
potential issues on the long-term sustainability of the grid.  
11 Ratchet effect is widely overlooked in regulation of distribution companies. It signals the DSOs that they 
do not have to improve their efficiency, as there is no clear way of measuring productivity increases apart 
from comparing DSOs relatively. See Hellwig et al. (2018) for an empirical analysis of the ratchet effect in 
the German electricity markets. 
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al., 2019).  The change in electricity markets can be seen as similar to developments in other 12
platform markets. The fall in transactions costs makes the integrated entity of a distribution 
company relatively more inefficient in comparison to other alternatives such as vertical 
disintegration of the distribution operator. Kiesling et al. (2019) argues that “as peer-to-peer 
transactions in energy capacity become more feasible, our results suggest that ownership of 
DER capacity will be driven less by one’s expected intensity of use and more by relative price 
concerns and subjective preferences for energy self-sufficiency or environmental attributes.”  
 
While the physical and regulatory characteristics of the electricity industry do not allow for 
complete platform markets, falling transactions costs make the distribution companies 
vulnerable to competitive forces. Advances in technology will give way to more electricity 
equilibrium beyond the meter.   
 
4. Regulating A Complex System with Price Controls 
 
The reason for economic regulation is to enhance efficiency and fairness in the market 
simultaneously (Viscusi et al., 2005). The price/revenue cap models used by regulators around 
the world aim to establish a  balance between providing the service with reasonable profit and 
encouraging the firm to reduce the cost of the service. The firm is guaranteed to retain 
productivity gains for the regulatory period. The price-cap regulation includes complicated 
mechanisms to keep different aspects of service under control such as service quality and 
network security. Successful implementation of the regulation depends on the information flow 
to the regulator. DSO should be able to provide necessary information to the regulator in a 
timely manner and reliably. 
 
As the electricity system becomes more complex, the ability of the regulator to govern the 
industry harder. For example, firms adapt to the regulatory period. Incentives provided by the 
regulator become less attractive to DSOs toward the end of the implementation period 
especially for capital expenses (CAPEX), creating issues such as ratchet effect and 
x-inefficiency.  
 
While there has been major theoretical advances to integrate incentive-based regulatory models 
with contract theory (Laffont and Tirole. 1993), these works could not penetrate into practice to a 
great extent. The use of game theory and dynamic/strategic behavior provided tools to reduce 
principal-agent problems of the industry. These models, even though they are complicated, are 
not suitable to deal with complexity as they are based on static relationships between 
independent agents. 
  
12 While electricity has had its share of unbundling in recent decades, the separation of distribution 
monopolies into sub-markets seems to be next, as many services provided by an integrated distribution 
entity can be obtained from the market. Competition pushes utilities to rely on markets as much as 
possible to stay profitable..  
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In a complex market environment, the regulatory authority can only nudge market participants 
toward efficiency by closing the gap between price and marginal cost. The natural monopoly 
model starts from the assumption that natural monopoly’s cost structure and the available 
demand is exogenous to the model. Regulatory policy is used to alleviate inefficiencies in the 
system by designing tariff models, assuming that market participants do not change their 
behavioral patterns and act according to the model during regulation. These assumptions hold 
in industries where technology and demand do not change quickly. Electricity was the typical 
example along with water supply and telecommunications. In recent decades, electricity has 
started more like telecommunications than water supply in terms of being open to competition.  
A major issue with the existing tariff model is its assumption of constant technology. Since the 
model was designed in a period where the technology of distribution did not change 
substantially, the evolution of technical and economic aspects of tariffs was not part of the 
model. Technological advances in electricity markets have increased the complexity of the 
industry substantially.  Generation and wholesale/retail markets have become relatively 
competitive in recent years. Transmission remains a natural monopoly for the foreseeable future 
managed by the state enterprises in most cases. Distribution is close to losing its natural 
monopoly characteristics in the economic sense as a result of recent advances such as 
distributed energy resources (DER).  13
Regulatory model was usually thought to be part of a regulatory reform in many countries 
(Joskow, 2008). Electricity industries around the world evolved toward a more competitive 
structure, and DSOs began to see that electricity distribution was not a risk-free market. The 
establishment of the energy exchange and the evolution of complicated market transactions 
such as bilateral trading contracts created problems for inefficient distribution companies. 
 
In the beginning of regulatory reforms, the infrastructure was not expected to change quickly. 
The natural monopoly characteristics of the industry were assumed to remain intact for the 
foreseeable future. Thus, observing inputs and guaranteeing distribution companies some profit 
margin through regulatory processes were thought to be the right way to go. As a regulatory 
tool, the revenue-cap model in the distribution sector required the close monitoring of the 
industry by the national regulatory agency.  
 
 
5. Dismissing Complexity in the Turkish Electricity Markets. 
 
While the basic regulatory model in many countries are based on the theoretical model of 
incentive regulation, problems with implementation create major differences. There are many 
examples of the mismatch between a complex reality and simple regulatory model. Here we will 
touch upon a few issues to show the problem.  
 
13 Distribution companies, however, may stay as legal monopolies for non-economic reasons, even 
though economic reasons for protecting monopoly disappears.  
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The current regulatory model of electricity distribution was established in 2001 in Turkey. The 
lack of investments, vast inefficiencies in the industry, and increasing demand contributed to the 
move toward liberalization (Atiyas et al. 2012; Cetin and Oguz, 2007). However, the model did 
not have the necessary incentive mechanisms for DSOs to follow the privatizations completely. 
The absence of well-defined monitoring mechanisms over DSOs was a major impediment on 
the effectiveness of the regulatory model.  
 
After the completion of distribution privatizations in 2013, the electricity industry evolved toward 
a more competitive structure, and companies began to see that electricity generation was not a 
risk-free market. The establishment of the energy exchange and the evolution of market 
transactions created problems for inefficient companies and put pressure on the downstream 
segments of the market. 
 
In the beginning, the infrastructure was not expected to change quickly. The natural monopoly 
characteristics of the industry were assumed to remain intact for the foreseeable future. Thus, 
observing inputs and guaranteeing distribution companies some profit margin through regulatory 
processes were thought to be the right way to go. As a regulatory tool, the revenue-cap model 
in the distribution sector required the close monitoring of the industry by the national regulatory 
agency. However, mechanisms that would reduce the transactions costs of monitoring were not 
in place and the information asymmetry between the regulatory agency and the regulated firms 
became widespread. Regulatory models encouraged inefficiency in the industry. Asymmetric 
information problems have given way to stricter regulation of the industry.  
 
Regulatory issues in Turkey are mostly about debts of generation and distribution companies 
and how to keep consumer tariffs lower (Dilli and Nyman, 2015; Ozbugday et al. 2016). The 
focus on short-term goals that are closely related to political preferences make it difficult to put 
long-term issues to the forefront. To give an example, even though the current five-year 
implementation period ends in 2020, the model for the new period is still uncertain and there is 
not any discussion about how to account for technological advances within the new model.   14
 
While tariff models are complicated and differ in their structure, the widely used approach is to 
design a key distribution tariff model and relate it to retail tariffs. In Turkey, distribution tariffs 
create inefficiencies and are not designed to encourage competitive behavior.  
 
 
5.1. Illegal Use and Productivity Parameter  
 
The regulatory model of revenue cap is based on reducing costs by increasing productivity of 
firms in the industry. In a successful implementation of the model, efficiency in the industry and 
14 There are a number of EMRA-approved research projects by distribution companies on the tariff 
structure, renewables and microgrids. However, there is not any indication that these projects will provide 
input to the rate-making process in the beginning of the new implementation period.  
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productivity of firms are expected to improve. Empirical evidence shows that distribution 
companies are reluctant to improve efficiency (Hellwig et al., 2018).  
 
The initially designed model neglected institutional issues of energy markets in Turkey with the 
expectation that they would be mitigated in the future. Both distribution and retail tariffs include 
variables that increase the difference between price and marginal cost and distort incentives in 
the market. Political expediency was one of the reasons behind this approach. The government 
did not want to create more issues in the industry (Cetin and Oğuz, 2007). It also assumed that 
competition would take care of some of the issues gradually. This view was based on a static 
understanding of the concept of competition. The adaptation of market participants, particularly 
distribution companies, to the new institutional framework made existing issues such as 
long-term contracts part of the long-term model. To give an example, the cost of electricity theft 
is included in the national tariff as part of the distribution charge. Since illegal electricity use is 
around 16%, the addition of illegal use to the national tariff creates a number of inefficiencies as 
discussed in the literature (Yurtseven, 2015). The model is designed under the assumption that 
there would not be any leaks in the system such as illegal/unmetered use. Illegal use changes 
incentives of electricity users. Those who do not pay tend to use electricity excessively. Those 
who overpay tend to reduce their consumption creating deadweight losses in the market. The 
distribution company neglects measures to reduce illegal use as long as it gets paid. And, the 
regulatory authority prefers not to create any political burden for the government. Neglecting the 
adaptability of behavior and interdependencies between agents in the model creates an 
environment where the regulation supports inefficiency and rent-seeking instead of reducing 
them. As a result, illegal electricity use rates remain high (Orucu and Antmann, 2016) 
 
A major regulatory issue in the distribution tariff is the way productivity parameter is calculated. 
The productivity parameter is key to encouraging firms to eliminate inefficiencies wherever 
possible so the market moves toward competition. It is intended to incentivize distribution 
companies to improve productivity. However, the EMRA has chosen to set the  x-parameter to 
some distribution companies until the end of the current implementation period. In this way, 
productivity parameter loses its close connection with core of the incentive regulation, namely 
providing incentives to distribution companies (Orucu and Antmann, 2016: 38). This gives the 
wrong signal to companies about inefficiencies in the industry. Since the distribution model in 
Turkey is based on the balancing across regions in terms of revenues and expenditures, no 
distribution company is pushed hard to increase efficiency (Özbuğday et al., 2016) 
 
5.2. Distribution and Prices 
 
Similar problems arise in terms of retail prices as well. The regulatory model kept the price 
equalization and cross-subsidies across regions intact even though they were assumed to be 
transitory. The regions with high illegal electricity use are subsidized by regions with surpluses 
(Atiyas et al., 2012). These tools have become part of the institutional framework.  
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Retail price is an average price determined by the EMRA. They are independent of the marginal 
cost of supplying electricity across regions and across time.   Consumers do not pay the actual 15
marginal cost but an average price , which distort incentives for efficiency. On a typical summer 16
afternoon, those who consume more electricity tend to pay less than their true marginal cost, as 
they pay average prices. And the model does not differentiate in terms of willingness to pay. It is 
used as a cross-subsidy mechanism as in the case of the policy of charging different prices to 
the industrial customers and household.  
 
An efficiency-enhancing model is expected to adapt to changes in consumer behavior. For 
example, small scale electricity generation by consumers would change the regulatory model. 
Increasing share of solar energy such as rooftop solar panels and individual level storage 
makes demand for distributed electricity more elastic. The result is reduced consumption, 
increasing grid costs and further reductions in demand. The existing distribution tariffs cannot 
survive in the long run.  In the existing tariff mechanism, retail rate does not reflect enough 17
information signals for consumption and production. Thus, most customers do not change their 
consumption pattern even when a time-varying pricing mechanism is used. As prices increase in 
summer afternoons, consumers/producers should have the option to reduce their consumption 
and not buy/sell the electricity they generated to the system based on price signaling. The 
implementation of a tariff model that accounts for this complexity would create a major change 
in terms of distribution costs and sustainability of the grid. 
 
The regulatory model in the Turkish electricity industry is tilted toward the health of the 
distribution segment. Distribution companies are the center of the system. The government 
gives special emphasis to making sure that they obtain a reasonable profit. There is also 
pressure from the consumption side as increasing tariffs comes with political consequences. 
Thus, the model aims a balance between keeping prices low and profits for distribution 
companies high at the same time.  The tension between these conflicting aims has increased 18
inefficiencies in the market during the last decade. To this end, Köksal and Ardıyok (2018) 
argue that renewable energy support mechanisms and distortive level of regulated retail tariffs 
make efficient working of the electricity market difficult. As the feed-in tariff mechanism provided 
suppliers protection from price volatility, more suppliers joined the system and made the 
renewable support mechanism unsustainable competitively. As a general rule, when the 
demand has some responsiveness to prices, political interference in the market would only 
15 As Borenstein and Bushnell (2019) shows, continuously fluctuating demand changes private marginal 
cost in the same way. However, retail prices do not change in the same way. They are determined by the 
regulator in long intervals. The difference between demand changes and retail prices create deadweight 
losses in the market. More importantly, it distorts incentives for consumers. Their consumption 
increasingly becomes unresponsive to price changes. 
16 The consumer price is not an approximation of the cost of electricity. Instead, the price follows political 
preferences more closely than it follows the changes in economic costs (Oğuz et al., 2014).  
17 Policies such as Spain’s Sun Tax make things worse in terms of efficiency. 
18 This can be seen as an example of the Peltzman model on regulation. In an industry with high levels of 
debts and widespread inefficiencies, the protection of distribution companies means more deadweight 
loss and rent-transfer from consumers to distribution companies (Peltzman, 1989).  
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increase inefficiency and encourage rent-seeking.  The electricity market has a complex 19
structure and participants can adapt to changes in the rules very quickly without making a 
distinction between productive and unproductive entrepreneurial activities. Similarly, 
interdepencies across players and market segments make political interferences more costly. 
Including more suppliers to the renewable support mechanisms contributed to the distortion of 
the wholesale electricity prices, as suppliers are guaranteed to sell all of their capacity. 
 
A major problem in the Turkish model is the absence of capacity pricing, as it is closely related 
to the complexity of the system. Most of the literature in economics focuses on how to price 
electricity use. When there is widespread difference between capacity and actual demand, 
real-time pricing cannot accurately reflect the market demand and supply.  Currently, there is a 20
big difference between the capacity and actual use of electricity. At the end of 2017, the 
installed power capacity was around 85,000 MW.  The peak demand, at the same time was 21
around 47,000 MW. The absence of an incentive mechanism to reduce excess capacity invites 
new investment into the generation market. Correct peak-demand charges that reflect avoidable 
capacity costs could incentivize consumers move away from electricity use during peak time 
periods (Revezs and Unel, 2017).The absence of a connection between the capacity and 
electricity demand in the tariff methodology has encouraged ‘too much’ investment in the 
electricity generation. Renewable energy investments remained too high as well. The existing 
feed-in tariffs in Turkey encourages firms construct wind and solar power plants at a much faster 
rate than the efficient level since they do not undertake excess capacity costs. These costs are 
borne by the society because of the way the incentive mechanism is designed.  
​​ 
The above examples show that the existing tariff model is already flawed. They refer to cases 
where flaws in the model aggravate the costs even without considering increasing complexity in 
the market. It carries forward the institutional defects and reduces the efficiency of the electricity 
markets.  
 
 
5.3. Renewable Tariffs and Complexity 
 
Feed-in tariffs for renewable energy sources are determined under the assumption that 
suppliers will not change their behavioral patterns. However, suppliers as agents adapt to the 
new tariff mechanisms quickly and create unintended consequences, if treated as static players. 
The recent experience in the Turkish renewable support system, as discussed below, is a good 
case in point, even though the examples are abound around the world. 
 
19 This point is, even though widely accepted by most economists, usually overlooked in electricity 
markets.  
20 ​See Borenstein, S.  and S. Holland (2005), On the Efficiency of Competitive Electricity Markets with 
Time Invariant Retail Prices, Rand Economic Journal, 469. 
21 http://www.mondaq.com/turkey/x/782900/Renewables/Energy+2019 
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6. Conclusion 
Regulation started as an intervention to a one-directional simple model. Now, it has to adapt to 
the evolving and complex electricity system. Increasing complexity brings more decentralization 
and regulatory policy needs to have tools to adapt to the new environment. A model that is 
designed to work in a simple environment cannot deal with an adaptive and interdependent 
system. As the economic ability of market participants and the legal framework in the market 
diverge, incentives for rent-seeking and inefficiencies in the industry would increase (Barzel, 
1997). Controlling a complex system with simple tools would encourage wealth transfers in the 
society. 
 
The widespread availability of new technologies such as distributed energy resources, smart 
meters and smart appliances play a major role in the transformation of traditional uni-directional 
model of electricity tariffs. The generation beyond the meter and increasing consumer control 
over the timing of consumption, adaptability of the consumer to the changes in tariffs create 
more inefficiencies in the system.  
 
The changing ecosystem of electricity increases interdependencies in the system as well. In the 
old unidirectional model, the dependency of  the production system from generation to retail 
depended only on the demand of the consumer. Now, the consumer has the generation 
capacity and more power over the timing of consumption. This makes the decision-making in 
the tariff mechanism multi-faceted.  
 
Recent advances in platform markets will also affect the institutional structure of electricity 
markets. The distribution companies are the heart of the system in Turkey. Integrated 
distribution companies have started to become the origins of inefficiencies in the market rather 
than solutions to existing market failures. Distribution provides services that can be bought in 
the market to an increasing extent. The reduction in measurement costs creates sub-markets for 
many services provided by the regional distribution monopolies. They started to outsource many 
of their services to other firms to keep up with the increasing competition. The system has many 
characteristics of an evolution toward a platform-based market model.  
 
The concept of opportunity cost requires forward thinking. This also requires making a 
distinction between ‘sunk costs’ and ‘economic costs’. An efficiency-enhancing tariff model 
should be designed with a focus on ‘economic costs’ rather than aiming to recover sunk costs of 
distribution companies. Normally, marginal costs are expected to be lower than average costs in 
distribution. However, inefficiencies in the market do not allow evolving complexity to infiltrate 
the distribution model because of the natural monopoly model. This has been a major issue in 
the privatization of distribution companies in Turkey (Özbuğday et al. 2016).  
 
The incentive regulation model is used widely around the world. Its problems are also well 
documented. The problems with the price cap and revenue cap models in the distribution 
market have led to a move toward more output oriented tariff models. The problems of 
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estimating, benchmarking and even defining CAPEX and OPEX push regulators toward 
observing output variables so that the need for investigating the expenditures of a distribution 
company is reduced. As a result, the output based, or result-based, regulatory models have 
become the subject of research, especially after the implementation of the RIIO model in the 
United Kingdom.  While the UK model is new and its success is not certain, the need to modify 22
the revenue cap model is clear. Turkey needs a model that looks to the future rather than 
aiming to solve the problems of the past. 
 
Neglecting issues on regulatory dynamics as a result of increasing complexity contributes to the 
cost of electricity and creates a tension between legal structure and economic behavior. The 
result is increasing transaction costs and more regulation. Overregulation becomes the norm. 
 
As the new implementation period approaches in Turkey, the existing tariff methodology 
requires a substantial revision based on the past experience. Technological advances, changes 
in the demand structure and a more adaptive behavioral patterns by market participants 
necessitates a new tariff model that can accommodate the evolving complexity of electricity 
markets. However, the existing debates in media and literature do not provide any signal for a 
major change. This is unfortunate as the current system encourages inefficiency and punishes 
productivity gains.  
 
  
22 The model is known as ‘the RIIO model’ (Revenue = Incentives+ Innovation + Output). In this model, 
the outputs such as consumer satisfaction, reliability and availability, safety, connectivity, environmental 
impact and social responsibilities are being considered. Each DSO submits an 8-year plan that specifies 
total expenditures rather than CAPEX and OPEX separately. The aim is to balance conflicting incentives 
for reducing costs and increasing investments. 
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